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Abstract
Objectives To describe the context for implementing the
national programme for information technology (NPfIT) in
England, actual and perceived barriers, and opportunities to
facilitate implementation.
Design Case studies and in depth interviews, with themes
identified using a framework developed from grounded theory.
Setting Four acute NHS trusts in England.
Participants Senior trust managers and clinicians, including
chief executives, directors of information technology, medical
directors, and directors of nursing.
Results The trusts varied in their circumstances, which may
affect their ability to implement the NPfIT. The process of
implementation has been suboptimal, leading to reports of low
morale by the NHS staff responsible for implementation. The
overall timetable is unrealistic, and trusts are uncertain about
their implementation schedules. Short term benefits alone are
unlikely to persuade NHS staff to adopt the national
programme enthusiastically, and some may experience a loss of
electronic functionality in the short term.
Conclusions: The sociocultural challenges to implementing the
NPfIT are as daunting as the technical and logistical ones.
Senior NHS staff feel these have been neglected. We
recommend that national programme managers prioritise
strategies to improve communication with, and to gain the
cooperation of, front line staff.
Introduction
In 1998 the NHS Executive set a target for all NHS trusts to have
electronic patient records in place by 2005.1 By the spring of
2002, just 3% of trusts were set to meet this target.2 The
Treasury’s Wanless report suggested two main reasons for this:
budgets for information technology (IT), allocated locally, being
used to relieve financial pressures elsewhere, and the inadequate
setting of central IT standards.3 The report recommended ring
fencing and doubling the IT budget. The government responded
with £2.3bn ($4.4bn; €3.3bn) for a new national programme for
information technology (NPfIT) in the NHS in England.4 The
aim is for electronic patient records to be implemented in all
acute trusts by the end of 2007.
The size, complexity, and innovation of this national
programme (also now called Connecting for Health) makes it
the biggest outsourced IT project from the public sector ever
untaken.5 Implementing large scale health service IT projects, in
the United Kingdom and other countries, has proved difficult.6 7
Problems of achieving effective information flow between users,
the cornerstone of any integrated record system, and resolving
issues of confidentiality and security have led to reported failure
rates of around 30%.8 9 The recent IT implementation failure
experienced by the Wessex Regional Health Authority ended in
losses to the taxpayer of £43m.5 The NPfIT has been described as
“ambitious” and “inherently risky.”10 The National Audit Office is
currently evaluating whether the programme is likely to deliver
good value for money and reviewing implementation progress.11
A report is due in the summer.
The programme’s key features are new stringent national
data and IT standards, procured and paid for nationally.
Implementation in acute trusts will be through one of five
geographic partnerships with industry, called “clusters.” A minis-
terial taskforce and a NHS IT director general oversee progress.
The main national features are a new national networking
service providing broadband, called “N3”; electronic booking,
called “choose and book”; electronic transfer of prescriptions;
and a nationally accessible, “cradle to grave” summary patient
record called “the spine” (figure). The provision of electronic
functions at acute trust level form part of the NHS care record
service, a collective term for all aspects of clinical IT support
applications, from clinical decision making tools to digital x rays.
The output of these applications is intended to be a health
record that can be shared. The NHS care record service replaces
the earlier twin concepts of lifelong electronic health records and
local electronic patient records.1
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Details of the interview framework appear on bmj.com
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We are studying the processes and outcomes of implement-
ing the NHS care record service in four acute hospital trusts in
England. This involves assessing the local context in each trust, in
depth interviews of staff and patients over a two year period, and
a quantitative analysis of the effects of implementing three elec-
tronic functions of the record service. In this paper, we report
findings from each trust’s baseline assessment and information
gathered from the first round of interviews.
Methods
We collected baseline information by meeting key IT, finance,
and clinical directorate staff and reviewing documents and rou-
tinely published data. Interviews are taking place in three stages,
with stage 1 interviews (the focus of this paper) taking place
twice, at the start of the project and 18 months later. These inter-
views concern the development of NHS electronic patient
records. (Stage 2 and 3 interviews investigate how electronic
functions are experienced by staff and affect working practices
and how they affect patient care.) The data reported here are
from the first round of stage 1 interviews, with 23 senior manag-
ers and clinicians from the four trusts.
To enhance the generalisability of our findings, we selected
the four trusts to reflect a range of characteristics (differences in
size, number of sites, performance indicators, and financial situa-
tion) and various stages of implementing electronic health
records. Participants included all local senior management staff
involved in implementing the NPfIT, including the chief
executive, director of information technology, medical director,
and director of nursing.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted on a one to one
basis at each trust by a qualitative researcher. We developed the
interview framework by drawing on literature concerned with
installing electronic patient records to identify key constructs.12–14
Topics discussed included the processes and outcomes of imple-
menting electronic healthcare systems and the impact of the
NPfIT policies. Interviews were recorded and transcribed.
Data analysis
We analysed the interview transcripts in three stages based on
grounded theory principles of coding and theme abstraction15
rather than strict adherence to the theory of Glaser and Strauss.16
Literature on organisational change suggests the context and
processes of change will be multilayered and complex.17 We
explored this complexity by examining variations within and
between the four trusts, taking account of organisational changes
relating to NHS policy. We then grouped emerging themes
according to the context (each trust’s characteristics) because
“analysis of change needs to attend to the interplay between
processes, people, and events both internal and external to the
organisation.”18 We explored the relations between each trust site
and the wider organisation, between the organisation and the
individuals within, and between individuals and the technology.
Two members of the project team (JH and NF) independently
read the interview transcripts to agree on emerging themes.
Results
The table shows the baseline characteristics of each trust, includ-
ing level of implementation of existing electronic patient records
and the expected date for replacing the patient administration
system, the first step in implementing the NHS care record ser-
vice. Data from the first round of interviews show the potential
impact of these factors on implementing the care record service.
Multiple sites within trusts
Two of the trusts have multiple sites, resulting from recent
mergers, and problems of poor communication and coordina-
tion between sites remain. Differences in working practices and
organisational culture seem to have created tensions that may
make the job of getting ready for the NHS care record service
especially challenging (see box 1). Major changes resulting from
the recent mergers seem to have affected staff morale, increasing
the likelihood that staff will become resistant to the changes
required during implementation.
Table 1 Characteristics of the participating trusts
Characteristic Trust 1 Trust 2 Trust 3 Trust 4
Size Large Large Large Small
No of main sites 2 (recent merger) 2 (recent merger) 1 1
Financial situation* Moderate deficit (<£5m) Small surplus Large deficit (<£10m) Small deficit (<£1m)
Performance indicators† 1 star 2 stars 0 star 2 stars
EPR legacy e-function Site 1—no EPR
Site 2—electronic orders
Site 1—electronic orders
Site 2—electronic orders, PACS
No EPR PACS
Expected date for PAS replacement Unknown 2007 2006 2004-5 (earlier adoption of
electronic booking)
EPR=electronic patient records, PAS=patient administration system, PACS=picture archive and communication system.
*Annual accounts for 2002-3.
†CHI Clinical Governance Review 2002-3.
Box 1: Issues of multiple trust sites and change overload
“There’s the difference in cultures between the two ends of the
same trust, the culture where the whole senior management team
transported themselves over. And so I think at one end within the
trust, the [name] end, the clinicians and the nurses and others are
all used to a different way of working, which the people here are
not. So I think there is a big difference actually between—if you
ask people at that end I think you’ll find a very different
philosophy there.”—Clinical director, trust 2
“One of the things that definitely makes life much easier is that
we’re a single site organisation, so there is a single culture around
this place; we’re not a difficult political being with eight or nine
hospital sites spread around. From an IT point of view that’s very
difficult to support and manage.”—IT manager, trust 4
“So, like I said, I think the organisation, leaving aside the IT, has
quite a few issues still in terms of the changes it’s gone through.
Then add in the national programme and that’s just, just another
thing on top, and that’s going to affect working practices across
the whole organisation . . . It is yet another change, and I think
certainly people are fed up of change and people do identify the
national programme as being yet another IT project that is
probably not going to work, that’s going to cost a great deal of
money, and why should they really cooperate with it?”—Clinician
involved in development of electronic patient records, trust 1
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Communication between the national programme for
information technology and the NHS
The lack of clarity from the NPfIT about future developments—
with poor communication between NPfIT headquarters, the
local service provider, and trust managers—was reported to be a
major concern in all four trusts. Managers felt that local
needs and advice have been ignored and expressed sentiments
in interviews of feeling ignored, being “done unto,” and
disempowered (box 2). Participants’ views suggest a divide
between the central NPfIT office and trusts, with the latter
perceiving the former as failing to understand local issues. This
lack of communication seems to have filtered down, with manag-
ers reporting a reluctance to communicate the benefits of the
NPfIT to front line staff without having answers to questions
about what IT services will be supplied and when (box 2).
Financial circumstances of trusts
Two of the trusts have substantial financial deficits, which were
reported as contributing to slow progress on local IT projects
(box 3). Central funding does not cover all of the costs of imple-
menting the care record service, and local IT spending must be
sustained or increased to provide the infrastructure necessary to
support it.19 For participants, funding for the change manage-
ment associated with the care record service was a key concern.
Up to March 2004, instead of increasing spending, participants
in “cash strapped” trusts reported that scheduled IT implemen-
tation had been halted to await details of the NPfIT to be made
public (box 3). Understandably, trusts may be reluctant to spend
on IT if some of the cost will be covered centrally. This lack of
certainty seems to have created “planning blight,” with
participants reporting that few IT initiatives have been
championed (box 3), thus potentially widening the IT gap
between “cash rich” and “cash poor” trusts.
Performance ratings
For trusts with a low performance rating (0 or 1 star), improving
this rating was reported as a pressing concern (box 4). (Although
the future of performance ratings is under review, performance
indicators are likely to continue to be a key focus for trust man-
agers.) Benefits of the NPfIT (which has a 10 year roll out), such
as financial savings and improved patient care, will not be
realised until after money has been spent on implementation.
This will probably require investment in staff training as well as
the IT infrastructure, perhaps temporarily reducing staff time
available for clinical care. Trusts are likely to avoid any activity
that decreases rather than increases productivity unless sufficient
extra financial and human resources are provided (box 4).
Supporting “legacy” IT systems
The NHS has traditionally devolved IT procurement, resulting in
a proliferation of IT architecture. This approach contrasts with
centralised standard setting and procurement under the NPfIT.
Potential legacy problems reported by participants are the loss of
existing electronic functionality and concerns over support for
existing systems during any transition period.
All trusts in our study reported having highly effective
customised pockets of IT. If these systems cannot be integrated
with national “standards” some functionality may be lost (box 5).
Loss of existing IT function may stall progress and is likely to be
Box 2: Issues of communication with NPfIT
headquarters and lack of clinical engagement
“So I think we’ve not had, you know, we had some of the
interaction, and I think what we’ve been asking for is clarity
about, um, getting things done, what isn’t coming, things like.
There was really something last week about . . . the radiology
systems, about the radiology information system and PACs, and
in the application there’s no radiology information system, there’s
just PACs.”—Executive director, trust 2
“The communication has been appalling, absolutely appalling.
They’ve done some wonderful events, and I’ve met some people
who are great, NPfIT, who are very facilitative and very enabling,
and the next week you’re told you’re not allowed to talk to them.
I’ve been to some meetings where I’ve met people who are very
very good, and we’ve been ordered not, instructed, they’ve been
ordered and we’ve been instructed that it’s inappropriate to talk
to them.”—IT manager, trust 4
“Despite what people say there’s a lack of, there’s a lack of
engagement and, you know, even as chief executives, I think we’ve
been involved and been asked to promote something they, we’re
promoting—we say it’s a bit like trying to go and sell, probably in
IT terms, vapourware and that’s really what it felt like.”—Chief
executive, trust 3
“I would say that the clinicians are sort of waiting to see what’s
going to happen before they commit themselves.”—Assistant
director of nursing, trust 4
Box 3: Issues of financial deficits
“I mean our first, our number one priority in this trust been
stated by the [chief executive], and is quite clear to anybody, is
money. We have to claw back our deficit, a huge deficit; [name]
has an ever bigger one, and we are a very, um, broke strategic
health authority, actually, but particularly this local health
community. We’re very strapped for cash, and we have to find
millions and millions of pounds worth of saving this year alone
and indeed over the next three years.”—IT and NPfIT project
manager, trust 3
“And we have a senior management that have too much on their
plate to cope with at the moment, and EPR [electronic patient
records] and IT, as well as between [large figure] million pound
underlying deficit. We’re certainly not a trust that can invest from
our own resources.”—Medical director, trust 1
“We’ve made real progress, um, in the development of our EPR
programme, and those who’ve done so much work in that
particular programme are naturally quite distressed if our
particular EPR programme is simply going to go on hold for two,
three, or four years, while we wait for a national programme to
be implemented.”—Medical director, trust 1
“You know, the abandonment, the abandonment of the EPR has
had an affect on people’s desire to get involved too much in that
way—let’s wait until a bit later . . . I think there’s a ‘Let’s just not
invest too much time’ attitude at the moment and see how it goes
from here.”—Assistant director of nursing, trust 4
Box 4: Issues of performance ratings
“At the moment, you know, a lot of chief [executives], a lot of
your short term focus is on star ratings and performance
management because that’s where, you know, the carrot, that’s
why you’re driven down that route. So, you know, we’re paid to do
that and keep the strategic vision going, but it depends how
much pressure you get about where your focus could be.”—Chief
executive, trust 2
“So if that national programme wants this to happen they, the
government, whoever, must make sure any moneys that come
down through whatever route are ring fenced, and they’re ring
fenced right down to trust level, so that creative finance directors
and others cannot divert them for other purposes.”—IT and
NPfIT project manager, trust 3
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resisted. IT literate clinicians in our sample reported working
hard to develop systems that best support their needs and the
needs of their patients (box 5).
Replacing existing systems will require contracts with
existing suppliers to be redrawn. Maintaining goodwill and con-
tinued support for such systems may be difficult. Trusts that
actively pursued the original plan for electronic patient records1
may be particularly disadvantaged if they are bound into long
term contracts with suppliers not awarded contracts under the
national procurement process.
Timetable for replacement of patient administration systems
To implement the care records service software, most trusts will
need to replace their existing patient administration systems. The
new administration system will act as a foundation on which
additional “bundles” of clinical functions can be added. However,
patient administration systems cannot be replaced immediately
in all trusts. For example, in London this activity alone is
projected to take up to five years. The timing of this replacement
is causing concern, and participants reported that their trusts
have been jostling for a slot that meets their particular needs
(box 6).
Some trusts have reported an urgent need to replace existing
IT systems for radiology or pathology. According to participants,
the previously scheduled implementation of such replacement
systems has been put on hold until details of the NPfIT have
been made public (box 6). Such delay may mean a risk of system
failure, but buying a temporary solution is seen as costly. Being
first in the queue for implementing the care records service may
increase the risk of delays and teething problems, with details of
forthcoming support from the local service provider for change
management still unclear. However, being at the end of the
queue may lead to “planning blight,” with no new local IT
development until the new administration system is provided
(box 6).20
Discussion
The national programme for information technology promises
far reaching benefits for patients and throughout the NHS.21 The
immediate hurdle is the disruption and change that NHS staff
must undergo during implementation of the NPfIT. Persuading
people that “it will all be worthwhile” is at least as great a
challenge as the technical one.
Doubters need to reflect on alternatives. Not investing in IT is
not an option.19 22 The choice lies between a centralised approach
like the national programme or more piecemeal local solutions.
The benefits of the former are potentially much greater, but real-
ising these benefits depends on procuring systems that work and
managing their implementation without alienating staff. It is in
these areas that our study has identified room for improvement.
Our study suggests that NPfIT project managers need to
address four key issues:
Box 5: Issues of loss of functionality and resistance from
clinicians
“There’s a feeling of loss of autonomy, um, and possibly lack of or
loss of functionality, because some of the systems that we’ve got
are, have been developed over a period of time, and they’re pretty
well customised and people get used to that level of
customisation.”—Chief executive, trust 4
“Where it needs tailoring to local trusts—I don’t think that’s being
listened to at all, and that’s where they’re going to find the biggest
amount of resistance, which is where local systems will always be
better than the national solution.”—Electronic patient records
and NPfIT programme manager, trust 2
“Our ITU consultant writes programs: he wrote the ITU one
here, and he’s writing us a little program for duty doctor
handover. It’s like swimming in treacle to get it integrated into
our system. You can’t get it if you’re in a, you know, in a
regimented system that is becoming increasingly.”—Medical
director, trust 1
“If we’re saying to people, ‘You have to drop what you’ve got to a
lower function,’ well that’s going to be very hard to sell.”—IT
director, trust 4
“Until we can get that level of functionality built into the national
solution nobody is going to use it, well not from our trust
anyway.”—Electronic patient records and NPfIT programme
manager, trust 2
“So, yeah, they may have been working overtime developing their
own system and now are being told, ‘No, you can’t use it.’ And
you have something which isn’t as good or doesn’t allow as much
functionality or flexibility perhaps as something else.”—Research
and development business manager, trust 2
“As a taxpayer, I’m furious, as a clinician who’s dedicated time
speaking on behalf of other professionals who’ve spent hours of
unpaid time trying to make this work, they feel devalued,
marginalised, and ignored. So there’s enormous anger in this
organisation, particularly at [name], with the way in which we’ve
been dismissively treated.”—Medical director, trust 1
Box 6: Jostling for a new patient administration system
(PAS), concern over delays, and “planning blight”
“And so, obviously everybody wants the [new] PAS straight away,
and you’re obviously in the queue for that with everybody
else.”—Divisional manager, trust 4
“It’s going to be an absolute scrabble, you know, and I’m a bit
annoyed. We went to a launch day for the, for the [local service
provider] and one of questions I said, ‘You know, there’s 77 trusts,
a limited number of slots [for PAS replacement], you know, it is
going to be a big bun fight.’”—IT director, trust 4
“If we aren’t one of the first PASs, which I don’t think we are, it
could be 2010 or something before we even get a PAS, and then,
you know, we’ve got to implement all the various compliant
systems. So it could be a, over a decade before anybody, you
know, and it will be over a decade in some places before anybody
at some trusts see any difference.”—Chief executive, trust 4
“Our biggest sort of stumbling block for taking anything from
NPfIT is the fact that nine times out of 10 we’ve got to have the
[new] PAS in, so, as much as we would like to take some of the
modules, we can’t”—Electronic patient records and NPfIT
programme manager, trust 2
“It’s, well, it’s been delayed basically. I mean in implementation,
purchase and implementation of the system by a year and a half,
I think, while we’re inevitably waiting for the [local service
provider] to be sorted, and now we’re waiting for the process to
go though . . . It’s a bit of a mish-mash going on there, I must say.
Um, I think, you know, you’ve got to kind of look at your local
priorities in this case and say, ‘We need a new system in for risk
factors and for managing demand and recording data better, um,
and we need to go ahead and purchase as soon as we
can.’”—Divisional manager, trust 4
“NPfIT for London said, ‘No, you have to do it this way.’ And it’s
not, it’s just not up for negotiation, it is a very centrally driven
mandate. ‘You will take PAS, you will take some minimum orders
that include maternity and theatres, and then you can take some
prescribing and some pathways.’ So, we were definitely aiming to
do the clinical end of things first . . . it is frustrating because
that’s—you’re right, in terms of strategy we did not want to do our
PAS next and we did not want to do theatres and maternity.”—IT
director, trust 4
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x Trusts vary in their circumstances, which affect their ability to
implement the NPfIT
x The process of implementing the NPfIT has been suboptimal,
leading to reports of low morale among NHS staff responsible
for implementation
x The overall timetable for implementation is unrealistic, and
trusts continue to face uncertainties. The need to renew the
patient administration system in most trusts represents a bottle-
neck, with timings published in the NHS Care Record Service:
Indicative Deployment Plan23 not tying in with promises of
detailed electronic patient records being provided by the end of
200724
x Short term benefits alone are unlikely to be sufficient to per-
suade NHS staff to support the NPfIT wholeheartedly,
particularly if local IT functionality is reduced.
Limitations of study
These issues were communicated to us by interviewees, with sup-
porting information that showed their importance to the partici-
pating trusts. In these circumstances the validity of our findings is
not in question, but the small number of cases makes us cautious
about generalising more widely. In support of the generalisabil-
ity of the study, however, the circumstances of participating trusts
that were often the basis of managers’ concerns are prevalent
throughout the NHS: such as poor performance ratings (26% of
acute trusts have < 2 stars),25 having a financial deficit (18%),26 or
having recently merged.27 These issues did not necessarily
coincide in the participating trusts, supporting the view that they
are independent. Where the same issues occur in other trusts, we
would expect them to have a similar impact. The main limitation
of our study is that we may have missed important factors
because they were not present in our participating trusts. There-
fore, we cannot conclude that the issues highlighted in this
report are the only or most important ones.
Implications for the national programme for information
technology
NPfIT project managers can argue that these are still early days
for the national programme. However, the views of senior NHS
staff in our study represent a warning of the challenges ahead.
The process of implementation needs to change rapidly for NHS
staff to feel optimistic and to embrace IT changes with
enthusiasm. Moreover, attributing benefits unequivocally to the
NPfIT is likely to be difficult and to take time.28 29
Experiences of IT implementation in the UK12 and other
countries confirm the importance of sociocultural considera-
tions. A case study from Australia described a major failure of IT
implementation, identifying organisational and cultural factors
that led to the failure as well as technical ones, with the system
failing to meet staff expectations.9 In the United States introduc-
tion of the “computer physician order entry” led users to feel that
their work was disrupted and not facilitated and that the organi-
sation gained more than they did,30 with reports of an adverse
impact on team relationships.31
There are also major technical and logistical challenges to
implementation, but NPfIT project managers have shown
commitment to dealing with these.32 However, the sociocultural
challenges are equally daunting,33–35 and we found that senior
NHS staff felt these to have been neglected. One concern is that
staff will not experience tangible benefits in the near future,6 36
but will have to cope with disruption, uncertainty, and change,
and possibly a loss of IT functionality in the short term. In these
circumstances, a more sophisticated approach is needed to gain
the cooperation of front line staff, on whom success will depend.
What might be the features of such a revised approach? It is
clear from our interviewees that better communication is essen-
tial. However, improved communication could imply one way
traffic (from NPfIT headquarters to trusts), and this alone is
unlikely to win cooperation. An improved sense of realism would
be a start, such as reconciling the overall timetable with the
recently published schedule for replacement of patient adminis-
tration systems across trusts.23 Representative users of the NHS
care record service in trusts must become partners in the enter-
prise through genuine consultation; this is what is likely to give
them a sense of ownership and reward as systems are
introduced, even when the going gets difficult.
Conclusion
We recommend that NPfIT headquarters urgently revisit its pri-
orities, managing the changes in working practices in addition to
the technical challenges. The NPfIT is likely to succeed or fail
according to the groundswell of opinion, as well as its technical
performance (unless the latter is catastrophic). Over the next five
years, the NPfIT implementation will be seen either as a glass
half full or a glass half empty. In the words of one chief executive,
“This isn’t the end of things by any means. In 10 years time, when
they say, ‘IT system disaster.’ That’s what will happen, won’t it?
You can see the headlines now. But underneath, it will say how
things have improved.” Senior managers responsible for the
NPfIT need to ensure that NHS staff see the glass as half full.
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